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Corporate Governance’s Role in the Risk-
Return Paradox - New Evidence from Indian Firms 
Ranjan Dasgupta1 
Abstract 
Prior empirical research emphasises ‘troubled’ firm context and ‘quality management’ 
perspective as reasons for a ‘paradoxical’ or negative risk-return association for firms. 
But, to the best of our knowledge, no studies examine the role of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms in influencing such a ‘paradox’. Therefore, the study 
investigates this issue by classifying 675 sample Indian firms over the period 2000-2017 
into high performing and low performing firms in line with the strategic reference point 
theory and the behavioural theory. To fulfil study objectives, it uses four different firm-
return measures and estimate firm-level risk with standard deviations of each return 
measures previous 5 years’ values on a rolling basis. In the univariate model, the study 
uses the notion of target (reference) return level under firm’s own and social aspiration 
levels in time-variant and market cycles contexts, and then compute Kendall’s 
correlations in between distance from such targets and their standard deviations. The 
study also carries out a multivariate regression model with necessary controls to further 
validate its univariate findings. The study results report significant influential role 
that board size and women directors’ presence play in both high and low performing 
firms’ ‘paradoxical’ risk-return association. On the contrary, board meetings, busy 
board and board tenure develops a risk-return ‘paradox’ for high performing firms only. 
These results hold true across my return measures, strategic reference points, market 
cycles and corporate governance regimes after controlling for firm- and industry-level 
heterogeneities under both univariate and multivariate analyses. 
JEL classification: F65; G02; G31 
Keywords:  Risk-return paradox; Corporate governance; Reference point; Aspiration 
level; Firm-risk and -return measures. 
1 Goa Institute of Management, India 
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1. Introduction:
Traditional finance theory posits a risk-return trade-off wherein higher risk would only
be undertaken for higher expected return, thereby requiring a positive risk-return
association (Ghysels et al. 2005; Chari et al. 2019). However, starting with Bowman
(1980), plentiful empirical research in finance and strategic management reports a
negative risk-return association termed as ‘Bowman’s paradox’ (see the review by
Andersen et al., 2007). Prior research emphasises ‘troubled’ firm context (Bowman 1982;
Kliger and Tsur 2011; Dasgupta 2017; DasGupta and Pathak 2018; DasGupta and Singh,
2021) and ‘quality management’ perspective (Bowman 1980; Wiemann and Mellewigt
1998) as reasons for such a negative risk-return association.
In the former case, a low performing firm2 would take higher risk to improve its own 
performance, however due to lower operating performance that in turn might lead the 
firm to a negative risk-return association. On the contrary, a firm with ‘quality 
management’ could achieve higher performance with low risk-taking by using its 
organizational hierarchical structure and decision-making processes (Wiemann and 
Mellewigt 1998); market power (Cool et al. 1989); firm-size (Wiemann and Mellewigt 
1998); and diversification pattern (Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998) most efficiently. So, a 
negative risk-return association could also take place for a high performing firm.1 To the 
best of my knowledge, no earlier study has investigated this phenomenon and the 
probable influence arising from the existing corporate governance mechanisms.  
However, generally firms with ‘quality management’ would be less willing to take 
additional risk to improve its expected return. Thus, when a high performing1 firm 
undertakes higher risk, it would be a risk that generates higher return. This implies a 
probable positive association in risk-return for this kind of firms.3  
Accordingly, the study objectives here are three-fold. Firstly, the study wants to examine 
whether a firm’s [both poor and superior] negative risk-return association would arise 
from all individual corporate governance mechanisms undertaken here. On the contrary, 
the study will also investigate whether only board size and executive directors’ 
remuneration might have an impact on high performing firm’s conventional positive risk-
return relationship. Chari et al. (2019) earlier present evidence that risk-return ‘paradox’ 
is aggravated by agency problems that contribute to CEO career concerns (Dewatripont 
et al. 1999), and could be mitigated (but not reversed) by various governance mechanisms 
(such as large block owners, market monitoring for corporate control, vigilant board, 
institutional owners and CEO incentive alignment). The study is different from Chari et 
al. (2019) in three contexts. First of all, the study examines the role of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms in attenuating risk-return paradox for both low and high 
performing firms unlike Chari et al. (2019) who undertake different composite measures 
of corporate governance for all firms at a time. In addition, they don’t find any significant 
impact of individual corporate governance mechanisms on firm’s risk-return association. 
However, the study results are completely different in this regard. Secondly, here risk and 
return measures are calculated after adjusting for firm’s own historical aspiration and its 
2 A low performing firm is one which performs below than the cross-sectional median value i.e. the 
reference point [see strategic reference point theory (Feigenbaum et al. 1996)] of all study firms undertaken 
here. Reversely, a high performing firm performs above the reference point.    
3 These basic propositions help the study to formulate its first main hypothesis as depicted in the Data and 
Methodology section. 
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social aspiration in terms to industry peers. This implies that both firm’s own 
heterogeneity and industry heterogeneity have been accounted for unlike Chari et al.’s 
(2019) direct measure of risk and return computed from ROA. Lastly, Chari et al.’s (2019) 
paper is based on USA firms whereas the study uses Indian firms i.e. in an emerging 
market context with distinctive variability in regard to investor protection rights and risk-
orientation in national culture. Accordingly, the study can argue that its results will 
portray different theoretical underpinnings for the concerned literature. Prior research 
also reports that multiple mechanisms operate together either as substitutes (high level of 
one mechanism rules out the need for other mechanisms) or complements (high level of 
one mechanism is more effective in presence of other such mechanisms) (Misangyi and 
Acharya 2014). However, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) criticize a total measurement as a 
good proxy for overall sound corporate governance because an index requires that each 
of the constituents would be weighted and till date an appropriate system of such weight 
is unresolved in empirical literature. Accordingly, they suggest that a single mechanism 
of firm’s corporate governance could be even more suitable proxy of strong corporate 
governance presence than a general index. Therefore, the study have used other 
(independent from Chari et al. 2019) corporate governance mechanisms distinctively, and 
probably yet to be explored in literature to examine their standalone impact on influencing 
the Bowman’s ‘paradox’ more specifically.  
Prior research also explains risk-return ‘paradox’ resulting from value-reducing risk-
taking arising from poor managerial decision-making due to lower ability (i.e. lack of 
‘quality management’) or different risk-preferences (Andersen et al., 2007). Accordingly, 
the study builds its second objective based on prospect theory’s (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) observation that decision-makers might frame the situational context in relation to 
a reference point i.e. if such context is framed as a loss in relation to the reference point, 
managers would tend to be more risk-seeking than when the same situation is framed as 
a gain. To capture this effect, the study divides all firms based on cross-sectional median 
value of returns i.e. the reference point (in line with strategic reference point theory of 
Feigenbaum et al. 1996), firms above which (i.e. above-median or high performing firms) 
would be risk-averse, and on the contrary, below-median firms (i.e. low performing firms) 
would be risk-seeking. Presumably, the study expects a negative risk-return association 
for low performing firms and a positive one for high performing firms. However, for high 
performing firms with ‘quality management’ and amidst distinctive influential corporate 
governance mechanisms, low risk – high return situations could also entail a Bowman’s 
‘paradox’.   
The study’s third objective is grounded on behavioural theory (Cyert and March 1963), 
as firm-managers might base risk-estimations on performance comparisons with a 
referent aspiration level of performance. When firm-performance is below their aspiration 
level, firms take more risk in searching for probable solutions to mitigate the gap than 
when performance exceeds the aspiration level. Here, the study computes both firm’s own 
historical performance and its social performance (Massini et al. 2005) based 
performance-aspiration gap for short-term (1 year) and long-term (5 years). The study 
does this to find whether there is any discrepancy in its main results due to this 
longitudinal computational difference (see Ruefli 1990; and Henkel 2000).4 Presumably, 
4 Ruefli (1990) earlier reports different results in relation to firm’s risk-return association with shorter and 
longer time-periods. However, Henkel (2000) criticises stating that it might be possible that the variance of 
some firms’ returns is low over the long-term and high over the short-term, and vice versa for other firms. 
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for firms whose performance is below their aspiration level (i.e. low performing firms), 
the study expects a negative risk-return association whereas high performing firms with 
a positive performance-aspiration gap would probably show a positive risk-return 
association. The study’s social performance-aspiration gap measure would also capture 
the weak decision-making abilities of managers who would pursue higher risk strategies 
with lower returns (see Anderson et al. 2007).   
 
Empirical literature also propagates the overall role of corporate governance reforms on 
firm’s risk-taking by the wealth effect of investments channel and private consumption 
of the resources channel (John et al., 2008). The former channel positively impacts firm’s 
value-enhancing risk-taking amidst a higher level of wealth effect from investment, 
whereas later develops a negative influence on firm’s such behaviour in presence of 
higher level of private benefit. Thereby, an improvement in corporate governance reforms 
could therefore increase the utility from the wealth effect from investment and 
simultaneously decrease the utility from private benefits (Lu and Wang 2018). This in 
turn could encourage higher value-enhancing risk-taking. Prominent scholars also 
observe that weak corporate governance mechanisms in board practices and executive 
compensation policy would have encouraged excessive risk-taking by a firm (Erkens et 
al. 2009). On the contrary, many studies also report evidences of negative association 
between such reforms and firm’s risk-taking behaviour (Cohen and Dey 2013). 
Accordingly, here the study tests its univariate and multivariate analyses pre-2013 and 
post-2013 under robustness tests to capture the impact of stricter corporate governance 
regime (as promulgated in 2013 through 2013 Companies Act) on Bowman’s ‘paradox’ 
of Indian firms. 
 
Overall, the study contributes to the existing empirical literature in three ways. Firstly, 
the study results report the significant influential role that board size and women 
directors’ presence play in both high and low performing firms’ ‘paradoxical’ risk-return 
association. More specifically, we find that small board size and lower women directors’ 
presence is causing the ‘paradoxical’ risk-return association for low performing firms, 
however, large board size and higher women directors’ presence could create a negative 
risk-return association for high performing firms. These results imply agency problems 
(Jensen 1993; Chari et al. 2019) and problemistic search behaviours (Gupta 2017; 
DasGupta and Pathak 2018) for low performing firms. On the contrary, for high 
performing firms, the study’s observation is that higher women dominance in boards 
(Adams and Funk 2012) and large board size (contradicting empirical literature [see e.g. 
Sah and Stiglitz 1986; 1991; Cheng 2008; etc.]) are actually creating a risk-seeking 
behavior and thereby causing value-destruction (Andersen et al. 2007; and Chari et al. 
2019) for these firms. Lack of quality management (Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998) is 
also evident in these firms. On the contrary, board meetings, busy board and board tenure 
develops Bowman’s ‘paradox’ in risk-return association for high performing firms only. 
These results are in line with Fich and Shivdasani, (2006); Falato et al. (2014); etc. and 
reiterate that busy directors are associated with higher risk-taking in high performing 
firms which might be due to less effective monitoring or implies value-reducing risk-
taking (Andersen et al. 2007; and Chari et al. 2019). The study results also contradict with 
the ‘reputation hypothesis’ (Chen 2015) that higher board tenure mitigates the career 
concerns for board members with enhanced reputation which in turn could generate 
higher returns at lower level of firm-risk. It rather finds that higher board tenure is 
                                                                
However, it appears plausible that this is an exception, and that the majority of firms show a similar degree 
of volatility over both the long- and short-terms. 
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impacting firm performance negatively whereas it has a positive influence on firm-risk. 
This also might depict a value-reducing risk-taking by these firm-managers (Andersen et 
al. 2007; and Chari et al. 2019) or complacency due to no career concerns. In addition, 
the study results support Jensen (1993) that in case of high performing firms which might 
not performing well higher board meetings is actually for firm’s problemistic risk-taking 
and not resulting in superior firm performance (see Lipton and Lorsch 1992; and Ntim 
and Oser 2011). It is also intriguing to report that EDR only has a positive mediating 
effect on high performing firms’ negative risk-return association. This implies that 
managerial compensation driven firm performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976) is evident 
in all Indian firms (in line with Akbar et al. 2017). So, overall, the study observes strong 
corporate governance driven quality management perspective in Indian firms which 
influence high performing firm’s ‘paradoxical’ (low risk – high return) risk-return 
association. However, the ‘troubled firm’ context of Bowman’s ‘paradox’ is not fully 
evident en-route through all individual corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
The study’s second contribution is that along with the known ‘paradoxical’ risk-return 
association of low performing firms (strategic reference point based), firms short-of 
historical or social aspiration levels also show a negative risk-return association. These 
results are exactly in line with the theoretical underpinnings of strategic reference point 
(Fiegenbaum et al. 1996) and behavioural theory (Cyert and March 1963). Conversely, 
firms which are high performing in this regard display a conventional positive risk-return 
association. These results are true both for short- and long-term aspiration levels, and 
across my return measures and market cycles.  
 
Lastly, all return measures here i.e. ROA and ROE (post-tax); EBITDA ratio (pre-tax) 
and cash ratio (liquidity) under main and robustness tests results report similar results. 
Therefore, it can be said that Bowman’s ‘paradox’ is not contingent on the return 
measures used, rather in line under different market cycles, corporate governance regimes 
and strategic orientations for firms. In addition, it validates this study’s claim that risk 
and return measures computation here have addressed the weaknesses as being reported 
in earlier studies (Albrechtet al. 2004; Brick et al. 2015; Almamy et al. 2016; Dasgupta 
2017; DasGupta and Pathak 2018; etc.). 
 
The remaining portion of this paper is organized as follows - next section deals with the 
relevant literature and hypotheses developed, section 3 provides data and methodology, 
section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes the discussion, followed by 
references.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses developed: 
 
2.1. Reference point theoretical overview: 
The possible logical explanations of Bowman’s risk-return ‘paradox’ being promulgated 
so far can be categorized into - those developed on prospect and behavioural theory 
findings (Cyert and March 1963; Bromiley 1991; Dasgupta 2017; Gupta 2017; DasGupta 
and Pathak 2018; DasGupta and Singh, 2021); strategic and organizational factors 
(Bowman 1980; Cool et al. 1989; Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998) and empirical model 
misspecifications (Bromiley 1991; Henkel 2000). 
 
The prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) postulates a target (i.e. reference) 
return level above which a firm would be risk-averse, but is risk-seeking below this point 
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(see Bowman 1982; Kliger and Tsur 2011; Dasgupta 2017; Gupta 2017; DasGupta and 
Pathak 2018; DasGupta and Singh, 2021). This induces low performing firms (i.e. firms 
below reference point) to take higher risk to improve their performance, however due to 
lower operating performance that in turn leads them ex post to a negative risk-return 
association. However, a high performing firm would be less willing to take additional risk 
in order to improve its expected return. Thus, when a high performing firm does assume 
additional risk, it would be a risk that generates higher returns. This implies a positive 
risk-return association for this kind of firms.2  
 
Accordingly, this study classifies a firm ‘above’ (‘below’) group if its pooled average 
return over the sample period is higher (lower) than the reference point (i.e. cross-
sectional median value). The study also uses similar process for bull and bear sub-periods 
study undertaken here.5 Therefore, in accordance with Bowman’s (1980) ‘paradox’ (for 
low performing firms) and classical positive (for high performing firms) risk-return 
association, the study would test the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There exists a negative risk-return association for firms below reference 
point (i.e. cross-sectional median returns) (i.e. for low performing firms). On the 
contrary, there exists a positive risk-return association for firms above such reference 
point (i.e. for high performing firms). These associations are static across market cycles 
and return measures.  
 
2.2. Aspiration level theoretical overview: 
Firm’s risk-taking is a strategic behaviour and performance-aspiration gap guides this 
firm-behaviour (Cyert and March 1963; Fiegenbaum et al. 1996). Accordingly, most early 
researchers use aspiration level to explain risky choices of firms (Bromiley 1991). When 
firm-performance is below its aspiration level, firms would take more risks in searching 
for solutions to mitigate the gap than when performance exceeds firm aspiration. Here, 
the study computes both firm’s own historical performance and its social performance 
(Massini et al. 2005) based performance-aspiration gap for short-term (1 year) and long-
term (5 years). This would incorporate the longitudinal impact on measures used if any 
(see Ruefli 1990; and Henkel 2000).3 For firms whose performance is below their 
aspiration level (low performing firms), the study expects a negative risk-return 
association whereas high performing firms with a positive performance-aspiration gap 
would probably show a positive risk-return association. Therefore, the study would test 
the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There exists a negative risk-return association for firms with 
performance below their aspiration level (i.e. negative performance-aspiration gap) 
(i.e. for low performing firms). On the contrary, there exists a positive risk-return 
association for firms with performance above their aspiration level (i.e. for high 
performing firms). These associations are static across market cycles and return 
measures. 6 
                                                                
5 The bull and bear sub-periods are classified by comparing annual NIFTY-50 Index returns with the risk-
free rate. The study considers average annualized 91-day T-Bill yields as proxy for risk-free rate during the 
corresponding year throughout the study period. Accordingly, only the years 2008-09, 2011-12, 2012-13 
and 2015-16 are found to be bear years within its overall study period. 
6 The study calculates both short-term (1 year) and long-term (5 years) performance-aspiration gap based 
on firm-adjusted [firm’s own historical performance] and industry-adjusted [firm’s social performance] 
aspiration level here for overall study period on a rolling basis. This would capture the static nature of such 
association provided the results are on similar lines (see Henkel 2000).  
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2.3. Corporate governance mediating effect: 
It would be a common perception that a large firm-board with diverse experience, 
knowledge and resource possessions would probably have more meticulous learning and 
decision-making processes, thereby resulting in improved firm-performance. Theoretical 
models of Sah and Stiglitz (1986; 1991) also observe that firm-performance would be less 
variable when it has a large board. This is due to delay in reaching consensus for 
improbable problems of communication and coordination [see agency theory of Jensen 
(1993)] which might result in less risk-taking practices (Cheng 2008). Thereby, the study 
presumes that firms with large board might cause a negative risk-return (low risk – high 
return) association. On the other hand, Yermack (1996) argues that firms with smaller 
boards have better firm-performance in comparison to firms with larger boards. He also 
reports that small boards would be more likely to endorse riskier R&D-intensive 
investment projects that in turn would increase overall firm-risk. Thereby, the study 
presumes that firms with small board size would undertake high risk and accordingly 
would generate superior operating performance. Therefore, the study would test the 
following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Small board size might have a positive mediating effect on firms’ 
conventional positive risk-return association. On the contrary, large board might 
positively mediate firms’ negative risk-return association. These associations are static 
across market cycles, return measures and changing corporate governance regimes.7    
 
It would also be pertinent to consider that in case of emerging economies like India, the 
advisory and resource catering role of firm’s board members (see resource dependency 
theory [Pfeffer 1972]) is more critical than the monitoring role. Thus, independent board 
members as a result of their resource dependence role would help firms in pursuing 
growth rather than constraining firms from risk-taking (Singh and Delios 2017). 
However, according to the reputation hypothesis, non-executive directors would support 
investments in low-risk projects which would help a firm in avoiding losses and thereby 
protect the firm-image and their reputation (Pathan 2009). There are also plenty of 
empirical evidences supporting a negative relationship between presence of higher 
independent directors on firm-board and its risk-taking (Brick and Chidambaran 2008). 
Empirical literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Singh and Delios 2017) also reports that 
a high percentage of outside directors on firm-board would have a positive impact on 
firm-performance. In this context, Jackling and Johl (2009) find that board independence 
has a positive influence on firm-performance in India. Thereby, the study presumes that 
firms with high percentage of independent directors in their boards would undertake low 
risk, but could still generate superior operating performance. On the contrary, boards with 
lower percentage of independent directors could generate lower returns at higher risk 
                                                                
7 Along with bull and bear sub-periods study, the study here also undertakes a pre-2013 and post-2013 sub-
periods (a comparable 3 years period) study with its main analyses under robustness tests to capture 
deviations (if any) in my main results. This is because in 2013 a stricter corporate governance regime is 
introduced by the GOI in the form of The Companies Act, 2013 inter alia contains stricter provisions 
relating to board constitution, board processes, board meetings, independent directors, general meetings, 
related party transactions, audit committees, disclosure requirements in financial statements, etc. The study 
presumes that due to these stricter provisions post-2013 results might indicate more robust differential 
causal influence on especially erstwhile low performing firms’ negative risk-return association, if any. This 
is because their corporate governance mechanisms have had to be strengthened in line with new provisions.    
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level (Chari et al. 2019). Therefore, the study would test the following research 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: High and low board independence respectively might have a positive 
mediating effect on high and low performing firms’ negative risk-return association. 
On the contrary, board independence has no role to play in firms’ conventional positive 
risk-return association. These associations are static across market cycles, return 
measures and changing corporate governance regimes.6    
 
Most of the empirical studies document positive impact of women directors on firm-
performance (Erhardt et al. 2003; García-Meca et al. 2015), however only in developed 
market contexts. Also, Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2012) report no link between gender 
diversity in Indian boards and firm-performance. On the contrary, Adams and Funk 
(2012) provide evidence that woman directors are induced to make riskier decisions than 
their male peers and that these decisions could lower profitability. These effects might be 
significant when women directors face more obstacles than men peers in making 
decisions in the firms like that in prevalent social-cultural contexts in India. Thereby, the 
study presumes that low performing firms1 with high percentage of women directors 
might display a negative risk-return (high risk – low return) association. On the contrary, 
many studies argue that in profitable firms, women on firm-boards are induced to exercise 
excessive monitoring, thereby following less riskier decisions that in turn might decrease 
its relative performance and subsequent shareholder value (Adams and Ferreira 2009; 
Ahern and Dittmar 2012). However, Loukil and Yousfi (2016) observe that women 
directors’ presence in firm-boards enhance performance at low level of risk-taking. 
Thereby, the study presumes that high performing firms with high percentage of women 
directors in their boards would undertake low risk, but could still generate superior 
operating performance. Therefore, the study would test the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: Higher women directors’ presence might have a positive mediating 
effect on firms’ negative risk-return association for both low and high performing 
firms. On the contrary, it also might have positive mediating effect on high performing 
firms’ conventional positive risk-return association. These associations are static 
across market cycles, return measures and changing corporate governance regimes. 6    
 
Frequency of board meetings is regarded to be another important way to improve the 
effectiveness of the board (Adams and Ferriera 2009) through effective monitoring and 
intensity of board activities (see resource dependency theory [Pfeffer 1972]). Since 
meetings provide members of the board with the chance to come together, and to discuss 
and exchange ideas on how they incline to monitor managers and firm strategy, the study 
can argue that higher frequency of meetings would put optimum control over manager’s 
activities. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that more frequent board meetings generate 
higher firm-performance. However, Johl (2006) finds that there is a negative relationship 
between frequency of board meetings and entrepreneurial activities such as risk-taking in 
firms. On the contrary, Jensen (1993) suggests that in such cases firm-boards would be 
relatively inactive and proof of higher board activity is likely to symbolize a response to 
poor performance i.e. problemistic search (risk-taking) behaviours. Bhagat et al. (2015) 
emphasize the number of risk committee meetings as the driver of market performance 
which implies strong risk governance or balanced risk-taking by firms. Thereby, the study 
presumes that high performing (see footnote 1) firms with high board meetings would 
undertake low risk, but could still generate superior operating performance. On the 
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contrary, high board meetings could also due to below-average past performance which 
initiate higher risk-taking by low performing firms. Therefore, the study would test the 
following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.4: Higher board meetings might have a positive mediating effect on firms’ 
negative risk-return association for both low and high performing firms. On the 
contrary, board meetings would have no role to play in firms’ conventional positive 
risk-return association. These associations are static across market cycles, return 
measures and changing corporate governance regimes. 6    
 
Singh and Delios (2017) report that firms in emerging markets like India structure their 
boards in consideration of the resource dependence and advisory role of the board rather 
than just the monitoring role of it. Accordingly, firm-directors with multiple outside 
appointments, as a result of being more networked, could generate benefits by assisting 
to bring in required resources, suppliers and customers to a company (see resource 
dependency hypothesis [Pfeffer 1972]; and Booth and Deli 1996). Ferris et al. (2003) also 
observe that directors are more likely to secure additional board seats when their firm 
performs well (i.e. in line with quality hypothesis [Fama and Jensen 1983]). Sarkar (2009) 
in Indian context supports both ‘resource dependency hypothesis’ and ‘quality 
hypothesis’, however finds that multiple directorships by executive directors are 
negatively related to firm-performance. Thereby, the study presumes that for high 
performing firms (see footnote 1), multiple directorships of board members could 
enhance firm-performance at lower level of risk. On the contrary, many empirical studies 
find that busy directors are linked with less effective monitoring or detrimental to it (Fich 
and Shivdasani 2006; Falato et al. 2014). Less effective monitoring could initiate high 
firm-risk and thereby would make firms vulnerable to value-reducing risk-taking 
(Andersen et al. 2007; and Chari et al. 2019). Thereby, the study presumes that low 
performing firms with busy board would undertake high risk, but could only generate 
below-average (than their peers) or lower operating performance. Therefore, the study 
would test the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.5: Busy board might have a positive mediating effect on firms’ negative 
risk-return association for both low and high performing firms. On the contrary, board 
busyness has no role to play in firms’ conventional positive risk-return association. 
These associations are static across market cycles, return measures and changing 
corporate governance regimes.6    
 
Anderson et al. (2004) observe that effective monitoring being potentially an acquired 
skill, boards with higher tenure provide more vigilant monitoring. However, as board 
tenure increases, managers might be better able to influence director’s opinion, thereby 
implying director tenure exhibits an opposite relation to oversight firm-risk. Also, as 
higher board tenure mitigates the career concerns for board members with enhanced 
reputation (Chen 2015), this could further generate higher returns at lower level of firm-
risk. The study presumes that this might be the case of high performing firms (see footnote 
1). On the contrary, lower board tenure might create a potential for moral pressure or 
hazard, whereby directors can take actions that would generate lower returns and higher 
risk for shareholders, while obtaining favourable career outcomes for them.8 Thereby, the 
                                                                
8 Agency theoretic work on career concerns (Chen 2015) reports that career concerns create incentives for 
firm managers to use investment decisions to enhance their reputation by manipulating the labour market's 
assessment of their ability. This further results in value-reducing risk-taking.  
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study presumes that firms with shorter board tenure would undertake high risk, but could 
only generate below-average (than their peers) or lower operating performance. 
Therefore, the study would test the following research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.6: Higher and lower board tenure respectively might have a positive 
mediating effect on high and low performing firms’ negative risk-return association. 
On the contrary, board tenure has no role to play in firms’ conventional positive risk-
return association. These associations are static across market cycles, return measures 
and changing corporate governance regimes. 6    
 
Following Adams and Mehran (2003) and Brick et al. (2006), the study presumes that 
executive directors’ compensations are related to the difficult task of monitoring the firm. 
It also displays the skills and efforts carried out by the executive directors over discussing 
and establishing the overall strategic actions including risk-taking and monitoring 
financial and managerial actions. Accordingly, agency theory predicts that executive pay 
is positively related to firm-performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, 
managerial incentives based on firm’s financial performance, might encourage managers 
to take more risk (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), though find to be minimal in case of non-
financial firms (Akbar et al. 2017). Thereby, the study presumes that high board 
compensation positively influences both firm-risk and firm-performance, especially in 
case of high performing firms (see footnote 1). Prior empirical literature also argues that 
boards’ compensation rewards directors for excessive risk-taking through the use of 
short-term pay and stock options (De Young et al. 2010). On the contrary, Brick et al. 
(2006) find evidence that excess board compensation is associated with firm 
underperformance due to cronyism. Accordingly, the study expects executive directors’ 
compensation would be positively related to the exigency for firm-monitoring and the 
difficulty of the directors’ tasks, which in turn would be related to firm-complexity and -
risk. Thereby, the study presumes that high executive directors’ remuneration would 
positively influence firm-risk in low performing firms, but could only impact firm-
performance negatively. Therefore, the study would test the following research 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.7: Higher executive directors’ remuneration might have a positive 
mediating effect on firms’ negative risk-return association for low performing firms. 
On the contrary, it has a positive mediating effect in firms’ conventional positive risk-
return association for high performing firms. These associations are static across 
market cycles, return measures and changing corporate governance regimes. 6    
 
2.4. Firm-heterogeneities and dummies: 
In addition, existing literature reports that ‘previously existing risk-level’ (Bromiley 1991; 
Gupta 2017; DasGupta and Pathak 2018); ‘industry-nature and competition’ (Gupta 
2017; DasGupta and Pathak 2018); ‘market power’ (Cool et al. 1989; Gupta 2017; 
DasGupta and Pathak 2018) and ‘diversification’ (Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998) 
influence firm’s risk-return association (especially Bowman’s ‘paradox’). Therefore, the 
study incorporates size and age (proxy of ‘market power’), leverage (proxy of ‘previously 
existing risk-level’), liquidity (all control)9 and also related and unrelated diversified 
                                                                
9 The study also does partitions study to find whether firm’s age, size, leverage and liquidity partitions 
(above- and below-median firms divisions for young and old firms; small and large size firms; low and 
high leverage firms and low and high liquidity firms) report similar/different results in regard to firm’s risk-
return association. All these results are in line with the study’s overall results for both univariate and 
multivariate analyses. So, the study does not report them separately here for the sake of brevity.    
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dummy (proxy of firm’s ‘slack’, ‘industry-nature and competition’ and ‘diversification’) 
variables in its multivariate model. To moderate the influence of studied corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm’s negative risk-return association, the study also 
includes MD/CEO and Chairman duality in its multivariate model. This is because 
empirical literature (Kim and Buchanan 2008; Pathan 2009) reports a negative influence 
of such duality on firm-risk, whereas, due to high power and independence of decision-
making when Chairman and MD/CEO is the same person, it would impact firm-
performance positively (see Finkelstein 1992).    
 
3. Data and methodology: 
 
3.1. Data and variables descriptions: 
The study collects data pertaining to all related firm-level variables from the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess database for its selection of all firms listed 
in the National Stock Exchange (NSE).  The study period is spanning over 17 years from 
2000 to 2017. The study uses annual (as on 31st March each study year in rupee term) 
published data of sample firms. The study filters its sample by including only those firms, 
which existed continuously from 2000-2017 and for which all data are available. Also, 
the study excludes all financial, utility and public sector firms. This translates into a final 
overall sample of 11,475 firm-years (675 firms existing continuously for 17 years).10  
The study uses return on assets (ROA) computed by dividing net income to total assets 
(average) and cash ratio (CR) computed by dividing operating cash flow to total assets 
(average) as its main return measures. It also estimates firm-level risk with standard 
deviation () of each of the above accounting measures using preceding 5 years’ values 
on a rolling basis (see equation 3). To make the study more robust, it also uses return on 
equity (ROE) computed by dividing net income to shareholders’ equity (average) and 
EBITDA ratio computed by dividing EBITDA to total assets (average) and their standard 
deviations which represent firm-risk under my robustness tests. Risk and return measures 
computation under this study have also addressed the weaknesses as being reported in 
earlier studies (Albrechtet al. 2004; Brick et al. 2015; Almamy et al. 2016; Dasgupta 
2017; DasGupta and Pathak 2018; etc.). 
 
The study also uses age computed by subtracting firm’s year of incorporation from the 
current year; firm-size calculated as lognormal of total assets; leverage computed by 
dividing debt to total assets; and liquidity calculated as lognormal of cash and cash 
equivalents to control for firm-heterogeneities. It computes board size as lognormal of 
number of directors in firm-board; independent directors percentage [i.e. percentage of 
total directors] for each study year (then pooled); women directors percentage [i.e. 
percentage of total directors]; board meeting computed as lognormal of number of 
meetings held; busy board calculated as lognormal of number of external directorships 
firm-board members are holding; board tenure computed by lognormal of average 
number of years a firm-board is operating; and executive directors remuneration 
calculated as lognormal of total compensation (fixed and variable including stock 
options) executive directors are drawing from the firm. The study also incorporates 
related and unrelated diversified dummy to capture the influence of this kind of 
diversification on firm’s risk-return association, and a duality dummy to control for the 
                                                                
10 The study undertakes an out-of-the-sample robustness test to eliminate the chances of survivorship bias. 
However, there is no significant deviation from this study’s main reported results. Accordingly, this study 
argues that eliminated firms do not impact the main findings of this study. Therefore, they are not reported 
here for the sake of brevity.   
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power when Chairman and MD/CEO is the same person on other corporate governance 
mechanisms (Singh and Delios 2017).       
 
3.2. Risk and return measurement: 
Strategic management literature (Cyert and March 1963 [behavioural theory]; Ansoff 
1979 [strategic thrust]; and Fiegenbaum et al. 1996 [strategic reference point theory]) 
documents that strategic behaviour of firms such as risk-taking is guided by the 
discrepancy between firm-aspiration and -performance. On similar lines, most of earlier 
empirical studies examining Bowman’s ‘paradox’ in firm’s risk-return association 
throughout the world (see DasGupta 2017 for reference) emphasize Fishburn’s (1977) 
risk measure. Fishburn (1977) observes that risk is not necessarily a measure of deviation 
about an expected value rather it’s a function of distance from a target outcome. The 
target outcome is the strategic reference point (see Fiegenbaum et al. 1996) or aspiration 
level of the firm (historical or social [see Cyert and March 1963; and Greve 2003]), above 
which firms are risk-averse as their performance is above (better than), and conversely 
risk-taking when performance is below (worse than) that level. Both these situations 
could generate a negative risk-return association.  
 
Therefore, the study uses this notion of target (reference) return level in developing my 
model in line with DasGupta and Pathak (2018). Here, the target return (henceforth TAR) 
level for a firm for each study year is calculated in two ways:  
 
Firstly, the target (reference) return level for firm f (henceforth FTAR) in year t, i.e., 
FTARf,t, is calculated as firm’s return in the previous year (henceforth FTAR1year 
[measuring short-term historical aspiration level of the firm]), and also firm’s mean 
return for previous 5 years on a rolling basis (henceforth FTAR5 years [measuring long-
term historical aspiration level of the firm]), i.e., 
FTAR1 year = ActualReturnf,t-1                                                                                     (1.1) 
FTAR5 years = Mean-returnf,t-1...t-5                                                                                (1.2) 
 
The study also uses alternative industry-adjusted target (reference) return level 
(henceforth ITAR) which is the best proxy of social aspiration level of my sample firms, 
thereby making this study more in-depth and robust. The target return level for firm f in 
industry i in year t, i.e., ITARf,i,t, is calculated as cross-sectional mean return of industry 
for previous 1 year (henceforth ITARf,i,1 year [simply ITAR1 year and measuring short-term 
social aspiration level of the firm]), and also cross-sectional industry mean return for 
preceding 5 years on a rolling basis (henceforth ITARf,i,5 years [simply ITAR5 years and 
measuring long-term social aspiration level of the firm]), i.e., 
ITAR1 year = Mean-returni,t-1                                                                                      (2.1) 
ITAR5 years = Mean-returni,t-1...t-5                                                                                (2.2) 
 
Also, the study measures risk (henceforth ) as standard deviation of individual firm’s 
actual returns (henceforth AR) for previous 5 years on a rolling basis, i.e., 
 
                                     t-1  (ARj – AR)2 
(AR)t =                                                                                                                  (3) 
                                   j=t-6        n - 1 
Where, t = 2005, 2007,……., 2017 
AR = ROA and CR, and ROE and EBITDA  
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3.3. Test Design: 
The study splits the overall sample firms and all partitioned and sub-periods sub-samples 
in two divisions for each return measures - above (high performing)1 and below (low 
performing)1, which respectively corresponds firms below and above the cross-sectional 
median value of the whole group for the variable in each case. It does this to investigate 
‘Bowman’s paradox’ for low performing firms and regular positive risk-return association 
for high performing firms after incorporating Fishburn’s (1977) measure of risk. The 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and Fishburn’s (1977) risk measure 
suggest that managers are more inclined to accept variability the further below the target 
they find themselves.11 So, the standard deviation () of returns would be related to 
distance from target (DFT here) (this measures the performance-aspiration gap [i.e. 
attainment discrepancy]) when firms are below or above-median levels. The study 
defines DFT (for FTAR [1 year and 5 years]) as follows:  
DFTROAf,t = ACRROAf,tACRROAf,t-1           (1 year) 
DFTROAf,t = ACRROAf,tMeanROAf,t-1...t-5    (5 years)                                              (4) 
 
Where:  
DFTROAf,t = Individual firm’s return distance from the target return level (i.e. FTARf,t) 
in year t. 
ACRROAf,t = ROA actual return, for firm f in year t.  
ACRROAf,t-1 = ROA actual return, for firm f in year t-1 (i.e. previous year).  
MeanROAf,t-1...t-5 = ROA mean return, for firm f in year t-1….t-5 (i.e. previous 5 years) on 
a rolling basis.12  
For calculating ITAR (1 year and 5 years), the above formulae are reproduced in the 
following ways: 
DFTROAf,i,t = ACRROAf,i,tMeanROAi,t-1         (1 year) 
DFTROAf,i,t = ACRROAf,i,tMeanROAi,t-1...t-5     (5 years)                                           (5) 
 
Where:  
DFTROAf,i,t = Individual firm’s return distance from the target return level of the cross-
sectional industry mean return (i.e. ITARf,i,t) in year t. 
ACRROAf,i,t = ROA actual return, for firm f in industry i in year t.  
MeanROAi,t-1 = Cross-sectional ROA mean return of industry, for industry i in year t-1 
(i.e. previous year) on a rolling basis.  
MeanROAi,t-1...t-5 = Cross-sectional ROA mean return of industry, for industry i in year t-
1….t-5 (i.e. previous 5 years) on a rolling basis.10  
Then the study analyzes all DFT means (return measure) and the respective standard 
deviations (risk measure) (see equation 3) by Kendall’s correlation results for all return 
measures used here. It also conducts the scatter plot tests13 to justify the model as used, 
                                                                
11 Failing to achieve an aspiration for a firm is theorized to prompt problemistic search/risk-taking that 
results in organizational change. Therefore, more frequently organizational change occurs when 
performance is below, rather than above the aspiration level. When firm performance is above the aspiration 
level, it is expected to maintain the status quo (Bromiley et al. 2001), avoid actions that might cause its 
performance to go below aspirations (March and Shapira 1987), and strive for slightly higher performance 
(Cyert and March 1963). 
12 Similarly, the study also calculates for CR under main tests and for ROE and EBITDA ratio under 
robustness tests. 
13 These results point out the linear nature of datasets with minimum number of outliers. This encourages 
the study to apply correlation test of Kendall’s (1938) initially and multivariate regression model for further 
analysis.  
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but for the sake of brevity results are not shown here. The KS tests results also 
authenticate the normality of the data. 
The study follows the standard guidelines about when to use Pearson’s (1895), 
Spearman’s (1904) or Kendall’s (1938) correlation coefficients. Kendall’s  is mostly 
preferred as being less sensitive to outliers and also for its simplicity and interpretation 
ease (Kendall, 1962). So, as the study uses ordinal or non-normal data and as there are 
only few outliers, it uses Kendall’s (1938) test in comparison to other correlation tests. 
Kendall’s possible values range from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to +1 (perfect 
positive correlation), with the absolute value of τ implying the strength of the monotonic 
association between the two used variables (Chen et al. 2002). However, if Kendall’s 
value is consistently positive above the reference return level and negative below-median 
level, such results would tend to support the ‘Bowman’s paradox’ (for low performing 
firms) and conventional positive risk-return association (for high performing firms). 
 
3.4. Multivariate regression model: 
The study also carries out a multivariate regression model as shown below along with the 
univariate analysis supported by Kendall’s correlation results: 
f,t =  + 1RETURNf,t + 2DFTSTFTARf,t + 3DFTLTFTARf,t + 4DFTSTITARf,i,t + 
5DFTLTITARf,i,t + 6BSf,t + 7IDf,t + 8WDf,t + 9BMf,t + 10BUSYBOARDf,t + 11ATf,t + 
12EDRf,t + 13SIZEf,t + 14AGEf,t + 15LEVERAGEf,t + 16LIQUIDITYf,t + 
17RELATEDDIVERSIFICATIONf,t + 18UNRELATEDDIVERSIFICATIONf,t + 
19DUALITYf,t + f,t                                                                  (6)14,15 
 
Where, 
f,t = Firm risk measured by the return measures’ standard deviation for firm f at time t.  
RELATEDDIVERSIFICATIONf,t = Related diversified firm (=1) and others (=0) (dummy 
1) 
UNRELATEDDIVERSIFICATIONf,t= Unrelated diversified firm (=1) and others (=0) 
(dummy 2)  
DUALITYf,t = If Chairman and MD/CEO is same person (=1), otherwise (=0) 
 = Constant. 1, 2, ....., 19 = Coefficients. and f,t  = Error term. 
 
Other variables have usual meanings (defined earlier). Corporate governance variables 
are instrumental variables here. If the slope coefficient, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, in 
respective cases, comes out to be significant and positive, it would imply a strong 
conventional positive risk-return association for high performing firms mainly, whereas 
in case of low performing firms, significant negative coefficient results would indicate 
evidence of a Bowman’s (1980) ‘paradox’.16 
                                                                
14 The study also uses return measures as the dependent variable and risk measure ( of return measures) 
as the main independent variable along with other instrumental and control variables to find their influence 
on firm’s negative risk-return association. 
15 The study also incorporates a business group dummy variable (1 if part of a business group, otherwise 0) 
for sample firms under one additional robustness test. However, this dummy has not shown any significance 
and deviation in the main findings of this study. However, these results are not reported here for the sake 
of brevity. 
16 This is because given a certain reported firm-return performance, the study is trying to figure out the risk-
level estimated by the firm to generate that return. Hence it uses risk as the dependent and target (reference) 
returns as the independent variables of interest in the main model. 
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To present a very robust understanding on the issue, this study adopts a comparative 
approach amongst two methodologies i.e. panel fixed effect [FE] (with year and industry 
fixed effect) and dynamic OLS [DOLS], for exploring the risk-return association and CG 
impact on it. To start with, this study uses the Panel FE with OLS estimation for a basic 
general finding. This is undertaken over and above random effect model based on 
Hausman test results by which alternative hypothesis has been accepted. However, while 
studying such association for the diverse set of firms belonging to an emerging country 
like India, one should focus on two types of endogeneity issues - unobserved 
heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity. It has been noticed in empirical literature that 
unobserved heterogeneity results, in presence of omitted variables, affects both the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. In such a case, the use of FE estimation 
is recognized to be a robust approach. However, in the presence of dynamic endogeneity, 
such FE models result in biased estimation. The issue of dynamic endogeneity i.e. 
dependence of the explanatory variables on the lagged values of the dependent variable 
should not be present in this study model as the dependent variable is calculated in a 
rolling way and the main independent variable also captures the unobservable industry- 
and firm-heterogeneities. However, still to mitigate any unobservable dynamic 
endogeneity issue in study model, this study uses dynamic OLS. Also, this study performs 
the Granger (1969) causality test and Dumitrescu Hurlin (2012) causality test for panel 
data only to nullify any presence of reverse causality among the studied variables. 
However, this study does not report these results for the sake of brevity. 
 
4. Empirical results: 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics results: 
Results (see table 1) show that among the return measures ROA is the least volatile (SD 
of 5.38%), and ROE has the highest volatility (SD of 13.37%). In bear sub-periods this 
kind of volatility is higher than that of bull sub-periods. On the contrary, it is evident 
through high volatility of % of independent directors (SD of 8.47%) and % of women 
directors (SD of 5.53%) in firm-boards that firms regularly change their board 
composition although board-size and other corporate governance mechanisms are stable 
across time-periods. This kind of board composition volatility is visibly higher in bull 
rather than bear sub-periods. Interestingly, average executive directors’ remuneration is 
higher in bear sub-periods. On the other hand, firms are highly leveraged with highest 
volatility (SD of 17.17%) during bear sub-periods, and they show strong liquidity 
condition in bull sub-periods.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics results 
 
This table reports mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation (SD) statistics for 675 firms for the overall period, and bull and bear sub-periods. Here ROA stands for 
return on assets (net income/book value of assets) and proxy for firm’s operating performance; CR denotes cash ratio (operating cash flow/book value of assets) and represents 
firm’s cash/liquidity performance; ROE stands for return on equity (net income/book value of shareholders’ equity) and proxy for firm’s operating performance [under 
robustness tests]; EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation) ratio (EBITDA/book value of assets) indicates firm’s pre-tax book-unadjusted 
operating performance [under robustness tests]. Also, BS Log represents lognormal of board size (i.e. number of directors in the board); ID stands for independent directors 
(% of total directors); WD denotes women directors (% of total directors); BM Log depicts lognormal of number of board meetings; BUSY BOARD Log implies lognormal of 
number of directorships the executive directors are holding; BT Log denotes lognormal of average tenure of the board for the firms; EDR Log represents lognormal of 
executive directors remuneration; Log SIZE implies lognormal of the book value of assets (size proxy); Log AGE stands for lognormal of firm’s age (study year – year of 
incorporation); DE (debt-equity) ratio (debt/book value of assets) proxies for firm’s leverage; and Log C&CE implies lognormal of cash and cash equivalents for the firms 
and proxy for firm’s liquidity. Here, all the variables are calculated yearly for the overall study period, and bull and bear sub-periods on a rolling basis, and then panelled 
together for this study’s further analyses.               
Variables Overall period Bull sub-periods Bear sub-periods 
 Mean Maximum Minimum SD Mean Maximum Minimum SD Mean Maximum Minimum SD 
ROA (%) 6.02 36.93 -7.38 5.38 6.63 47.41 -8.00 5.69 4.82 39.82 -20.83 6.08 
CR (%) 12.66 54.91 -12.96 6.67 13.32 74.93 -9.44 7.06 11.44 44.27 -20.63 7.23 
ROE (%) 14.31 98.06 -55.52 13.37 15.08 107.14 -53.73 13.82 7.79 96.53 -173.51 18.33 
EBITDA ratio (%) 14.63 49.37 -0.67 6.63 15.05 50.15 -1.95 6.82 13.79 49.03 -3.22 7.60 
BS Log 0.99 1.35 0.43 0.12 0.98 1.36 0.48 0.12 0.99 1.32 0.30 0.12 
ID (%) 46.65 66.56 0.00 8.47 46.47 69.33 0.00 9.32 46.99 67.58 0.00 8.15 
WD (%) 5.33 33.48 0.00 5.53 5.03 41.47 0.00 5.82 5.93 29.91 0.00 5.34 
BM Log 0.73 1.38 -0.78 0.15 0.73 1.39 -0.12 0.14 0.71 1.42 -0.30 0.14 
BUSY BOARD 
Log 
0.46 1.63 -1.08 0.47 0.50 1.62 -0.90 0.45 0.53 1.63 -0.60 0.43 
BT Log 0.70 1.20 0.30 0.15 0.70 1.20 0.30 0.15 0.70 1.20 0.30 0.15 
EDR Log  1.15 3.00 -0.83 0.58 1.11 2.98 -0.84 0.58 1.24 3.17 -1.00 0.60 
Log SIZE 3.76 6.38 1.94 0.67 3.94 7.01 2.10 0.85 3.83 6.48 1.88 0.68 
Log AGE 1.57 2.18 1.28 0.19 1.59 2.18 1.28 0.20 1.57 2.18 1.28 0.19 
DE ratio 1.69 156.22 0.00 6.67 1.35 71.88 0.00 3.53 2.42 409.24 0.00 17.17 




AABFJ  |  Volume 15, No.3, 2021 
144 
4.2. Kendall’s  correlation results – low and high performing firms1: 
Table 2 (see next page) shows Kendall’s  correlation results for low and high performing 
firms for the overall study period, and for bull and bear sub-periods.17 Results shows that 
below-median (poor) firms under ROA (-.118***) report a significant negative risk-return 
association. On the contrary, a significant positive risk-return association is evident across 
my return measures [ROA (.283***) and CR (.195***)] for above-median (superior) firms. 
The bull and bear sub-periods results are also in tandem with the study’s reported results 
for the overall study period.  
 
The study reports that in low performing firms, board size has a significant negative 
influence on firm-risk in the overall period [ROA (-.071*) and CR (-.121***)] and in bull 
sub-periods [ROA (-.074**) and CR (-.142***)]. This is also true in its busy board 
corporate governance measure [ROA (-.077**) in overall and (-.076**) in bull periods]. 
Executive directors’ remuneration has a similar strong negative influence on firm-risk of 
low performing firms [under CR (-.120***) in overall, and under ROA (-.089**) and CR 
(-.127***) in bull periods]. On the contrary, both board size and executive directors’ 
remuneration has a significant positive influence and busy board also shows positive 
impact on firm-performance under all return measures across overall and sub-periods (see 
table 2 for coefficient values). Board size and executive directors’ remuneration also has 
a significant negative influence on firm-risk only in overall and bull periods for high 
performing firms. On the contrary, busy board has a significant negative influence on 
both firm-performance and firm-risk of such firms under all return measures across all 
periods.  
 
The study does not find any overall significant results supporting hypothesis 2 and 4 
except that independent directors significantly impact firm-risk for low performing firms 
only in bear sub-periods (0.060*), and board meetings (.092**) has a significant positive 
impact on it in such periods. However, in both cases firm-performance has a negative 
coefficient. For high performing firms, the study does not find any significant influence 
under independent directors and board meetings.  
 
The study also reports significant positive influence of women directors on firm-risk 
across overall [CR (.108***)]; bull [CR (.113***)]; and bear [ROA (0.068*) and CR 
(.102***)] periods for low performing firms. However, women directors have a negative 
impact on firm-performance [CR (-.083**)]. These results imply that though women 
directors are risk-seeking in low performing firms, however their attitude does not drive 
firm performance higher. Thereby, the reported negative risk-return association for 
below-median firms might be arising out of women directors’ presence. On the contrary, 
women directors have a significant positive impact on both firm-risk and firm-
performance across periods for high performing firms which in turn might cause the 
positive risk-return association.   
                                                                
17 The study has also calculated Kendall’s  for the partition sub-samples (i.e. based on size, age, leverage 
and liquidity) after further dividing them in below- (low performing) and above-median (high performing) 
firms based on respective cross-sectional median values of its main return measures (i.e. ROA and CR). 
These results are in line with the study’s main reported results. So, it does not hereby report them again for 
the sake of brevity.      
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Table 2: Kendall’s  correlation results 
 
This table reports Kendall’s  correlation results for 675 firms for the overall period, and bull and bear sub-periods after dividing them in above- and below-median firms based 
on return measures’ (i.e. ROA and CR) cross-sectional median values. Here, ROA stands for return on assets and CR denotes cash ratio. SD denotes standard deviation of return 
measures. Also, BS Log represents lognormal of board size (i.e. number of directors in the board); ID stands for independent directors (% of total directors); WD denotes women 
directors (% of total directors); BM Log depicts lognormal of number of board meetings; BUSY BOARD Log implies lognormal of number of directorships the executive 
directors are holding; BT Log denotes lognormal of average tenure of the board for the firms; EDR Log represents lognormal of executive directors remuneration. In addition, 
control variables of size, age, liquidity (lognormal values of respective measures) and leverage (D-E ratio %) of my model are also included. Here, all the variables are calculated 
yearly for the overall study period, and bull and bear sub-periods on a rolling basis, and then panelled together for this study’s further analyses. 
 Below-median (low performing) firms Above-median (high performing) firms 
 Overall period Bull sub-periods Bear sub-periods Overall period Bull sub-periods Bear sub-periods 
Variables Return SD Return SD Return SD Return SD Return SD Return SD 
Panel A. ROA results 
ROA 1.000 -.118*** 1.000 -.141*** 1.000 -.222*** 1.000 .283*** 1.000 .266*** 1.000 .188*** 
ROA SD -.118*** 1.000 -.141*** 1.000 -.222*** 1.000 .283*** 1.000 .266*** 1.000 .188*** 1.000 
BS Log .096*** -.071* .176*** -.074** .089** -.041 -.031 -.187*** .021 -.167*** -.011 -.177*** 
ID (%) -.018 .011 -.041 .021 -.012 0.060* .024 .045 .026 .014 .055 .058 
WD (%) -.006 .050 -.035 .046 -.022 0.068* .056 .042 .014 .033 .029 .044 
BM Log .057 -.027 .038 -.058 .016 .045 .002 .043 .027 .043 -.004 -.002 
BUSY BOARD Log -.013 -.077** .009 -.076** -.019 .002 -.072** -.065* -.036 -.081** -.115*** -.083** 
BT Log .031 .019 .026 .029 .021 .014 -.038 .010 -.073* .005 -.029 -.018 
EDR Log  -.018 -.046 .224*** -.089** .153*** -.025 .036 -.011 0.068* -.160*** 0.071* -.148*** 
Log SIZE .031 -.028 .032 .002 .074** -.093** .050 -.025 .005 -.035 -.007 -.126*** 
Log AGE .019 -.059 .030 -.044 .048 -.019 .027 -.048 -.072* -.025 -.020 -.022 
DE ratio -.127*** -.007 .017 .051 -.179*** -.016 -.350*** -.189*** -.002 .014 -.358*** -.210*** 
Log C&CE .165*** -.097*** .016 -.032 .096*** -.085** .115*** -.026 .044 -.035 0.068* -.018 
Panel B. CR results 
CR 1.000 -.018 1.000 -.015 1.000 -.017 1.000 .198*** 1.000 .259*** 1.000 .124*** 
CR SD -.018 1.000 -.015 1.000 -.017 1.000 .198*** 1.000 .259*** 1.000 .124*** 1.000 
BS Log .150*** -.124*** .143*** -.145*** .131*** -.068* -.042 -.165*** -.093** -.170*** -.004 -.146*** 
ID (%) .007 .033 -.006 .037 -.011 .037 .004 .030 -.025 -.012 -.005 .049 
WD (%) -.019 .110*** -.025 .112*** -.083** .102*** .035 .059 .017 .061 .021 .051 
BM Log -.034 -.028 -.026 -.043 -.021 .023 -.002 .059 .017 .040 0.076* .046 
BUSY BOARD Log .013 -.076* .003 -.073* -.020 -.056 -.131*** -.141*** -.151*** -.160*** -.078* -.113*** 
BT Log .001 .039 .008 .040 .004 .018 -.082** -.065 -.101** -.053 -.026 -.060 
EDR Log  .215*** -.123*** .202*** -.128*** .186*** -.062 .039 -.133*** -.019 -.140*** .132*** -.059 
Log SIZE .118*** -.187*** -.004 -.052 .125*** -.175*** -.066* -.109*** -.010 -.042 .005 -.068* 
Log AGE -.046 -.033 -.027 -.054 0.065* -.076* -.026 -.064* .018 -.014 -.033 -.009 
DE ratio .124*** -.002 .016 .042 .080** -.043 -.245*** -.196*** .024 .050 -.225*** -.155*** 
Log C&CE .084** -.135*** -.022 -.064* .104*** -.123*** .034 .028 .055 -.031 0.062* .054 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).                                                    
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Table 3: Kendall’s  correlation results (aspiration [historical and social short- & long-term] level results) 
 
This table reports Kendall’s  correlation results for 675 firms for the overall period, and bull and bear sub-periods after dividing them in above- (high performing) and below-
median (low performing) firms based on aspiration (historical and social short- & long-term) level cross-sectional median values. Here, ROA stands for return on assets and 
CR denotes cash ratio. SD denotes standard deviation. In addition, DFT(FTAR1); DFT(FTAR5); DFT(ITAR1); and DFT(ITAR5) stands for distance from firm-adjusted target 
(reference) returns for 1 year and 5 years, and distance from industry-adjusted target (reference) returns for 1 year and 5 years for both ROA and CR respectively. Here, all the 
variables are calculated yearly for the overall study period, and bull and bear sub-periods on a rolling basis, and then panelled together for this study’s further analyses. 

























Panel A. ROA-based results 
SDBelow-median -.228*** -.250*** -.115*** -.123*** -.341*** -.259*** -.085** -.123*** -.328*** -.372*** -.159*** -.155*** 
SDAbove-median .203** .279*** .199*** .196*** .329*** .363*** .236*** .227*** .354*** .317*** .191*** .184*** 
Panel B. CR-based results 
SDBelow-median -.192*** -.179*** .045 .027 -.265*** -.190*** -.067* -.078* -.293*** -.351*** -.032 -.036 
SDAbove-median .206*** .238*** .159*** .160*** .262*** .297*** .167*** .160*** .279*** .226*** .143*** .201*** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 




Therefore, the study results report that small board size and lower women directors’ presence 
is causing a paradoxical risk-return association for low performing firms and it also develops 
a conventional positive one for high performing ones. On the contrary, large board size and 
higher women directors’ presence could create a negative risk-return association for high 
performing firms. The study results also show that executive directors’ remuneration is driving 
a paradoxical risk-return association for both low and high performing firms.  
 
4.3. Kendall’s  correlation results – aspiration level results: 
The study’s Kendall’s  correlation results for both historical and social aspiration level and 
under both short- and long-term overwhelmingly report a positive risk-return association for 
high performing firms and a negative association for low performing firms (see table 3 previous 
page). So, it is proved that the nature of firm’s risk-return association is static longitudinally. 
The corporate governance results are also in line, so the study does not report them separately 
for the sake of brevity.  
 
4.4. Multivariate regression results:18 
Table 4 (see next page) presents multivariate regression results of the study model.19 In line 
with its earlier Kendall’s  correlation results, the study finds a negative risk-return association 
for low performing firms under ROA (-.184***) and CR (-.208***)2 for its main independent 
variable. On the contrary, high performing firms show a strong significant positive risk-return 
association [ROA (.619***) and CR (.628***)]. The bull and bear sub-periods results are also 
similar. 
 
The study results show that board size influences firm-risk significantly negatively [under CR 
(-2.659*)], however, has a positive impact on firm-performance for low performing firms under 
all return measures.20 For high performing firms also board size has a significant negative 
influence on firm-risk [under ROA (-9.829***) and CR (-6.780**)], but positively impact firm-
performance in the overall period. In both bull and bear sub-periods my results show similar 
trends. These clearly imply that small and large board size might be causing a paradoxical risk-
return association for low and high performing firms. On the contrary, the study finds that 
women directors significantly positively influencing firm-risk for both low and high 
performing firms [under CR (.079**) and CR (.090*)], however, they have a significant 
negative impact on firm-performance. In bear sub-periods the study results reiterate such main 
findings. These imply that higher women directors’ presence is behind the negative risk-return 
association of low performing firms and it might cause the same to superior firms. The study 
results report that busy board [ROA (-.895***)] negatively influence firm-risk of low 
performing firms. Also, it has a significant negative impact on firm-performance. On the 
contrary, for high performing firms, busy board has a significant positive influence on firm-
                                                                
18 The study in this section discusses the results mainly based on panel FE results. However, the DOLS results as 
shown in table 4 are exactly in line with these findings. So, these are not discussed in detail here for the sake of 
brevity.   
19 Reported R2 and Adj.R2 values for all models indicate the reliability of study results i.e. how reliably the study’s 
independent variable(s) are explaining firm-risk. Also, F-test values are significant at 0.01 significance level 
which validates its models’ goodness-of-fit.  
20 The study has also calculated taking firm-performance (through return measures of ROA and CR) as its 
dependent variable and firm-risk (SD of ROA and CR) as the main independent variable keeping all other 
variables intact. This is done to find out the influence of each of these corporate governance measures on firm-
performance so that the study can present their impact on channelizing negative and positive risk-return 
association for below- and above-median firms, if there is any. However, these results are not reported here in 
details (coefficients etc.) for the sake of brevity.  
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Table 4: Panel FE and dynamic OLS (DOLS) regression results  
 
This table reports panel FE [with year and industry fixed effect] and dynamic OLS (DOLS)  regression results (see equation 6) for 675 firms for the overall period, and 
bull and bear sub-periods after dividing them in above- and below-median firms based on return measures’ (i.e. ROA and CR) cross-sectional median values. Here,  (risk 
measure) is the dependent variable and firm’s return (i.e. ROA and CR) (main independent variable), distance (DFT) from the firm-adjusted and industry-adjusted target 
(reference) returns are independent variables. Here, ROA stands for return on assets and CR denotes cash ratio. In addition, DFT(FTAR1); DFT(FTAR5); DFT(ITAR1); and 
DFT(ITAR5) stands for distance from firm-adjusted target (reference) returns for 1 year and 5 years, and distance from industry-adjusted target (reference) returns for 1 year 
and 5 years for both ROA and CR respectively. Also, BS Log represents lognormal of board size (i.e. number of directors in the board); ID stands for independent directors (% 
of total directors); WD denotes women directors (% of total directors); BM Log depicts lognormal of number of board meetings; BUSY BOARD Log implies lognormal of 
number of directorships the executive directors are holding; BT Log denotes lognormal of average tenure of the board for the firms; EDR Log represents lognormal of executive 
directors remuneration. This study also incorporates the control variables of size, age, liquidity (lognormal values of respective measures) and leverage (D-E ratio %) in my 
model. To make it more robust, dummy variables of related and unrelated diversified firms and duality (0 if Chairman and MD/CEO is the same person and 1 otherwise) are 
also included. Here, all the variables are calculated yearly for the overall study period, and bull and bear sub-periods on a rolling basis, and then panelled together for this 
study’s further analyses.  
 Below-median (low performing) firms Above-median (high performing) firms 













 Panel FE DOLS Panel FE DOLS Panel FE DOLS Panel FE DOLS Panel FE DOLS Panel FE DOLS 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































- - - - - - 
R2 20.5% 36.0% 20.7% 41.52% 34.7% 51.07% 45.3% 61.69% 52.4% 46.14% 36.1% 55.15% 
Adj. R2 15.5% 26.66% 15.5% 27.28% 30.3% 39.65% 42.1% 49.31% 49.4% 33.75% 31.7% 38.37% 







































































































































































































WD (%) .079** 0.124* .031 0.032 -.027 0.005 .090* 0.053 .130** 0.152 -.010 -0.012 
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R2 30.9% 41.85% 14.6% 39.57% 31.3% 48.88% 42.1% 53.35% 53.6% 55.94% 37.6% 50.71% 
Adj. R2 25.9% 29.91% 8.3% 25.86% 26.1% 39.29% 38.1% 36.82% 50.1% 44.12% 32.5% 38.85% 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
Note: All regression models are good-fit at 0.01 significance level based on their F-test values from the ANOVA analysis. So, separately they are not shown here for the sake 
of brevity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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risk [ROA (.848*) and CR (1.027*)], however, conversely significantly negatively impacting 
firm-performance. The bull and bear results are exactly on similar lines. So, it is evident that 
busy board might cause a paradoxical risk-return association for high performing firms, 
however for low performing firms the study finds no such evidence. Board meetings influence 
high performing firms’ firm-risk positively, but, have a significant negative impact on firm-
performance. The study finds similar results for bear sub-periods. It also reports a significant 
negative influence of EDR [under CR (-3.353***)] on firm-risk for high performing firms 
whereas a mixed influence for low performing firms, however, it impacts firm-performance 
positively for all firms. This is also clearly evident in both sub-periods. So, there is a 
contradicting viewpoint for all firms. The study reports that board tenure positively influences 
firm-risk for high performing firms across overall and sub-periods. On the contrary, it has a 
significant negative influence on firm-performance for these firms. On the contrary, the study 
does not find any influence of lower board tenure on low performing firms’ paradoxical risk-
return association.  
 
Therefore, overall, the study accepts hypothesis 3.1 and extends it as small board size is also 
causing Bowman’s ‘paradox’ for low performing firms. It also accepts hypothesis 3.3 as its 
results show that in case of both low and high performing firms, women directors’ presence 
might be causing a negative risk-return association. The study accepts hypothesis 3.4 only 
partially as its results report that board meetings significantly positively influencing firm-risk 
of high performing firms, whereas it would have a negative impact on firm-performance. In 
addition, the study also accepts hypothesis 3.5 partially only for high performing firms as its 
results show Bowman’s ‘paradox’ in their risk-return association. The study accepts hypothesis 
3.6 again partly only for high performing firms where results show that board tenure might be 
causing a negative risk-return association in line with Bowman’s ‘paradox’. The study results 
contradict hypothesis 3.7 as it finds a significant negative risk-return association for high 
performing firms, whereas a mixed risk-return association for low performing firms in overall 
and bull and bear sub-periods. However, in post-2013 periods low performing firms’ results 
got reversed (see robustness tests). 
 
The study’s firm-control results are also mostly significant across return measures and sub-
samples and in line with its initial observations.    
 
4.5. Aspiration level results: 
The FTAR and ITAR results are also mostly in line for the study’s overall study period, and 
bull and bear sub-periods. The FTAR and ITAR results for corporate governance’s influence 
on low performing firms’ negative risk-return association many times show contradictory 
results in comparison to its main return measure’s (ROA and CR) impact on it. DFT(FTAR1) 
also show a significant negative association under multivariate results, however DFT(FTAR5) 
presents a contradictory positive relationship under both ROA and CR measures. This might 
happen due to the wider deviation in firm’s short-term aspiration-performance gaps, however, 
in the long-term in line with mean-reversion facet, such gaps become neutralised. The bull and 
bear sub-periods result in this regard mostly in line except DFT(FTAR5) always depict a 
negative risk-return association across all return measures. However, in case of high 
performing firms, DFT(FTAR5) again depict a negative risk-return association across all return 
measures in overall and bear periods. Conversely, in the bull periods DFT(FTAR1) presents a 




AABFJ  |  Volume 15, No.3, 2021 
152 
4.6. Explanations of contradiction: 
The study finds regular positive risk-return association for high performing firms, however, the 
corporate governance mechanisms impact on firm’s risk-return association mostly show that 
they create a paradoxical relationship for these firms. Therefore, to explain this contradiction, 
the study divides its high performing firms again into five return-quintiles (i.e. Q1 to Q5) where 
Q1 implies firms with lowest operating performance and conversely Q5 firms would be the 
superior ones. Arguably, Q1 firms would undertake higher risk in order to rise up the pecking 
order with their peers. This might create a paradoxical risk-return association for them. On the 
contrary, Q5 firms would always display a conventional positive risk-return association. 
The study results are exactly in line with these theoretical arguments as under Q1 (-.209 for 
ROA and -.209 for CR), the study finds a significant negative risk-return association for these 
high performing firms. Therefore, the observation under this study is that as the firms are rising 
in pecking order of returns among high performing firms, they are generating a positive risk-
return association from a negative one in bottom quintiles. Accordingly, the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms is mostly for these bottom quintiles firms, and irrelevant for higher 
quintiles high performing firms.      
 
4.7. Robustness tests results: 
The study conducts two sets of robustness tests - by introducing two additional return measures 
i.e. ROE and EBITDA ratio; and testing its models for pre-2013 and post-2013 sub-periods (a 
3-year period each) which would test any results variation post-implementation of a stricter 
corporate governance regimes for Indian firms. Table 5-6 (see next page)reports the Kendall’s 
 correlation results and multivariate regression results for my two robustness tests.21 The 
study’s univariate results are exactly in line with its main findings. 
 
In addition, both robustness tests report the study’s initial main multivariate findings that board 
size influences firm-risk negatively and firm-performance positively (see table 6). This is true 
for all firms (more robust for superior firms), across time-periods and in both pre- and post-
2013 periods. On the contrary, here, the study finds that board independence’s impact on 
driving a negative risk-return association for both low and high performing firms is 
strengthened in post-2013 period i.e. under a stricter corporate governance regime. Women 
directors’ presence and board meetings robustness results under additional return measures, 
on the other hand, prove the study’s initial main findings for all firms, however, does not show 
any significant result when it tests for pre- and post-2013 periods. In case of busy board, 
additional return measures results are exactly in line with the study’s initial main findings i.e. 
it mediates firm’s Bowman’s ‘paradox’ risk-return association. However, it is interesting to 
note that under both pre- and post-2013, 3-year sub-periods, busy board impacts low 
performing firm’s both firm-risk and firm-performance significantly negatively. But, in case 
of high performing firms, the study’s initial main findings are in line with pre-2013 results, but 
post-2013 a conventional positive risk-return association is reported might be due to the stricter 
corporate governance regimes. Under robustness tests, board tenure does not report any 
significant results. On the contrary, EDR results under all robustness tests document a 
Bowman’s ‘paradox’ for both low and high performing firms. This implies that EDR is one of 
the most critical corporate governance mechanisms which influence firm-risk negatively 
whereas firm-performance positively without any time-specific (pre- and post-2013) 
intervention.  
                                                                
21 The study does not report its aspiration level robustness tests results separately here for the sake of brevity.  
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Table 5: Kendall’s  correlation results (robustness tests with two additional return measures and pre- and 
post-2013 sub-periods)  
 
This table reports Kendall’s  correlation results for 675 firms for the overall period, and pre- and post-2013 sub-
periods after dividing them in above- and below-median firms based on undertaken respective return measures’ 
(i.e. ROE and EBITDA ratio [first robustness test], and ROA and CR [second robustness test]) cross-sectional 
median values. Here, ROE stands for return on equity; EBITDA ratio denotes EBITDA-to-book value of assets; 
and also, ROA stands for return on assets and CR denotes cash ratio. SD denotes standard deviation of return 
measures. In addition, BS Log represents lognormal of board size (i.e. number of directors in the board); ID stands 
for independent directors (% of total directors); WD denotes women directors (% of total directors); BM Log depicts 
lognormal of number of board meetings; BUSY BOARD Log implies lognormal of number of directorships the 
executive directors are holding; BT Log denotes lognormal of average tenure of the board for the firms; EDR Log 
represents lognormal of executive directors remuneration. In addition, control variables of size, age, liquidity 
(lognormal values of respective measures) and leverage (D-E ratio %) of study model are also included. Here, all 
the variables are calculated yearly for the overall study period, and pre- and post-2013 sub-periods respectively on 
a rolling basis, and then panelled together for this study’s further analyses. 
 Below-median (low performing) firms Above-median (high performing) firms 
Variables Return SD Return SD Return SD Return SD 
Panel A. Robustness tests – two additional return measures 
 ROE EBITDA ratio ROE EBITDA ratio 
ROE/EBITDA ratio 1.000 -.144*** 1.000 -.011 1.000 .213*** 1.000 .207*** 
ROE/EBITDA ratio 
SD -.144*** 
1.000 -.011 1.000 .213*** 1.000 .207*** 1.000 
BS Log .104*** -.054 .157*** -.071* .000 -.092** -.044 -.136*** 
ID (%) -.019 .050 .039 .058 -.009 .027 -.014 .004 
WD (%) -.005 .041 .008 0.061* .011 .021 -.002 .005 
BM Log -.017 -.006 -.008 -.031 .002 .025 .022 .041 
BUSY BOARD Log -.036 -.060* -.023 -.035 -.072** -.018 -.100*** -.115*** 
BT Log .002 .008 -.015 .024 -.071* -.023 -.045 -.030 
EDR Log  .164*** -.039 .076** -.057 .076** -.122*** .037 .001 
Log SIZE .034 .033 .039 -.050 .003 -.058 .039 -.009 
Log AGE .020 -.006 0.061* -.029 -.010 .012 -.024 -.028 
DE ratio -.129*** .249*** .079** -.006 -.138*** .088** -.266*** -.203*** 
Log C&CE .132*** -.041 .036 -.129*** 0.068* -.030 0.067* .019 
Panel B. Robustness tests – pre- and post-2013 sub-periods 
Panel B1. Pre-2013 sub-periods 
 ROA CR ROA CR 
ROA/ CR 1.000 -.208*** 1.000 -.038 1.000 .196*** 1.000 .184*** 
ROA/ CR SD -.208*** 1.000 -.038 1.000 .196*** 1.000 .184*** 1.000 
BS Log .124*** -.075** .110*** -.097*** .016 -.117*** -.019 -.073* 
ID (%) -.015 .008 -.019 .073** -.005 .047 -.067* -.027 
WD (%) .059 .020 .053 .099** 0.073* .036 .018 .069 
BM Log -.003 .031 -.024 .043 .003 .020 .111*** .019 
BUSY BOARD Log .060 -.039 -.017 -.098** -.028 -.085** -.035 -.104** 
BT Log -.038 .059 -.002 .014 -.045 -.057 -.044 -.059 
EDR Log  .251*** -.096** .200*** -.093** 0.071* -.077* .100** -.030 
Log SIZE .178*** -.091** .101*** -.149*** -.025 -.088** -.046 -.062 
Log AGE 0.063* -.044 0.067* -.084** .006 .001 -.037 .021 
DE ratio -.066* -.060* .144*** -.050 -.380*** -.217*** -.268*** -.161*** 
Log C&CE .208*** -.093** .084** -.109*** .087** .001 .031 .046 
Panel B2. Post-2013 sub-periods 
ROA/ CR 1.000 -.265*** 1.000 -.058 1.000 .168*** 1.000 .125*** 
ROA/ CR SD -.265*** 1.000 -.058 1.000 .168*** 1.000 .125*** 1.000 
BS Log .019 .018 .115*** -.014 .021 -.168*** .032 -.157*** 
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ID (%) -.071* .089** .008 .024 .029 .016 .027 .035 
WD (%) -.032 .054 -.078** .032 .046 .054 .022 .034 
BM Log -.017 -.044 .005 -.069* .030 -.083** .099** -.007 
BUSY BOARD Log -.041 -.050 -.035 -.042 -.008 -.097** .000 -.091** 
BT Log -.045 -.006 -.032 .009 -.050 -.039 -.003 -.028 
EDR Log  .102*** .025 .185*** .000 .131*** -.098*** .174*** -.079* 
Log SIZE -.022 -.047 .093** -.086** .021 -.129*** .054 -.120*** 
Log AGE .023 0.065* .055 0.061* -.050 -.069* -.104** -.093** 
DE ratio -.257*** .095*** .038 0.066* -.283*** -.173*** -.163*** -.112*** 
Log C&CE .037 -.051 .116*** -.049 .136*** -.066* .148*** -.027 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * 
Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
           
       
Table 6: Panel FE regression results (robustness tests with two additional return measures and pre- and 
post-2013 sub-periods)  
 
This table reports panel FE regression results (see equation 6) [under robustness tests] for 675 firms the overall 
period, and pre- and post-2013 sub-periods after dividing them in above- and below-median firms based on 
undertaken respective return measures’ (i.e. ROE and EBITDA ratio [first robustness test], and ROA and CR 
[second robustness test]) cross-sectional median values. Here,  (risk measure) is the dependent variable and firm’s 
return (i.e. ROE and EBITDA ratio; and ROA and CR) is the main independent variable in respective models.# 
Here, ROE stands for return on equity; EBITDA ratio denotes EBITDA-to-book value of assets; and, also, ROA 
stands for return on assets and CR denotes cash ratio. Also, BS Log represents lognormal of board size (i.e. number 
of directors in the board); ID stands for independent directors (% of total directors); WD denotes women directors 
(% of total directors); BM Log depicts lognormal of number of board meetings; BUSY BOARD Log implies 
lognormal of number of directorships the executive directors are holding; BT Log denotes lognormal of average 
tenure of the board for the firms; EDR Log represents lognormal of executive directors remuneration. This study 
also incorporates the control and dummy variables as usual in all robustness tests.# Here, all the variables are 
calculated yearly for the overall study period, and pre- and post-2013 sub-periods on a rolling basis, and then 
panelled together for this study’s further analyses. 
 Below-median (low performing) firms Above-median (high performing) firms 
Variables Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test 
Panel A: Robustness tests – two additional return measures 
 ROE EBITDA ratio ROE EBITDA ratio 
Constant 6.233 .564 6.858 3.272 -13.510 -.819 7.289* 1.744 
ROE/ EBITDA 
ratio 
-1.054*** -10.605 .209 1.503 1.488*** 13.779 .715*** 4.100 
BS Log -2.300 -.268 -2.878** -2.000 -4.224 -.371 -8.843*** -3.136 
ID (%) .014 .143 .021 1.137 .130 1.056 -.041 -1.292 
WD (%) -.113 -.913 .041* 1.634 -.031 -.157 -.049 -1.045 
BM Log 7.634* 1.651 -.891 -.914 -12.161 -1.591 3.303** 1.994 
BUSY BOARD 
Log 
-1.795 -1.097 -.429 -1.313 1.041 .455 -.408 -.755 
BT Log 7.074 1.459 .376 .395 5.100 .715 -.333 -.193 
EDR Log  2.478 1.262 .043 .172 -8.884*** -3.837 -.408 -1.000 
R2 54.5% 22.5% 64.2% 48.3% 
Adj. R2 49.5% 17.7% 62.0% 45.0% 
Panel B. Robustness tests – pre- and post-2013 sub-periods 
Panel B1. Pre-2013 periods 
 ROA CR ROA CR 
Constant 5.000* 1.924 2.269 .716 6.232 1.256 6.506 .804 
ROA/CR -.085 -1.097 -.349*** -5.155 .522*** 4.963 .424*** 3.074 
BS Log -2.481 -1.395 1.266 .592 -4.735* -1.500 -6.243*** -1.371 
ID (%) -.005 -.262 .056** 2.390 .013 .343 .005 .104 
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WD (%) .014 .513 .029 .866 -.015 -.308 -.063 -.881 
BM Log -.056 -.060 2.095* 1.808 -.211 -.094 3.474 1.006 
BUSY BOARD 
Log 
-.153 -.399 -1.072** -2.326 .621 .839 1.453 1.370 
BT Log -.603 -.530 .027 .018 .469 .216 -1.900 -.627 
EDR Log  .113 .277 -.092 -.188 -1.245* -1.858 -.833 -.735 
R2 54.1% 31.3% 37.6% 46.3% 
Adj. R2 50.1% 25.4% 32.3% 39.8% 
Panel B2. Post-2013 periods 
Constant 5.433 1.487 5.019* 2.021 8.679 1.872 8.645* 1.857 
ROA/CR -1.160*** -15.005 -.098* -1.954 .163* 1.957 .067 .969 
BS Log .293 .120 .131 .077 -6.269* -1.919 -4.207* -1.350 
ID (%) -.038 -1.217 .042* 1.934 .062* 1.576 .090** 2.369 
WD (%) .047 1.109 -.007 -.227 -.069 -1.152 -.061 -1.164 
BM Log -1.346 -1.104 -1.639* -1.765 .786 .314 1.892 .888 
BUSY BOARD 
Log 
.112 .212 -.584* -1.497 -1.509** -2.284 -.416 -.692 
BT Log .507 .328 .447 .414 -.460 -.266 -.769 -.440 
EDR Log  -.082 -.154 .256 .689 -.649 -.949 .122 .177 
R2 55.7% 32.2% 18.9% 21.8% 
Adj. R2 52.6% 27.3% 12.8% 14.3% 
# The coefficients and t-test values of my firm-adjusted and industry-adjusted DFTs (1 year and 5 years 
respectively), control and dummy variables are not reported here for the sake of brevity. 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). * 
Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
Note: All regression models are good-fit at 0.01 significance level based on their F-test values from the ANOVA 
analysis. So, separately they are not shown here for the sake of brevity. 
 
 
5. Discussions and conclusion 
 
Empirical studies find two specific reasons under which a firm can show negative risk-return 
association in accounting context coined as Bowman’s (1980) paradox. The first one is from the 
‘troubled’ firm context (Bowman 1982; Kliger and Tsur 2011; Dasgupta 2017; DasGupta and 
Pathak 2018; DasGupta and Singh, 2021) which implies that a poorly (low) performing firm 
undertakes higher operating risks to maximise operating profit, but, failed to do so. Accordingly, 
a negative risk-return association with high-risk and low-return occurs. On the contrary, the other 
reason is provided by Bowman (1980); Wiemann and Mellewigt (1998); etc. is the ‘quality 
management’ perspective which can also cause a negative risk-return association. In this case, a 
firm with ‘quality management’ could achieve higher performance with low operational risk-
taking by using its organizational hierarchical structure and decision-making processes 
(Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998); market power (Cool et al. 1989); firm-size (Wiemann and 
Mellewigt 1998); and diversification pattern (Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998) most efficiently. 
However, in most cases this kind of superior (high) performing firms undertake higher risks only 
when there is a probability of higher expected returns. This would eventually attenuate a positive 
risk-return association for these firms.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, no earlier study has examined the impact of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms in influencing both risk-return paradox and superior firms’ positive risk-
return association respectively for all firms. One of the only earlier study which puts some insights 
in this context was that of Chari et al. (2019) who present evidence that risk-return ‘paradox’ is 
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aggravated by agency problems that contribute to CEO career concerns (Dewatripont et al. 1999), 
and could be mitigated (but not reversed) by various governance mechanisms (such as large block 
owners, market monitoring for corporate control, vigilant board, institutional owners and CEO 
incentive alignment). However, this study is different from Chari et al. (2019) in three contexts. 
Firstly, this study examines the role of individual corporate governance mechanisms in attenuating 
risk-return paradox and also positive association for both low (poor) and high (superior) 
performing firms respectively and find distinctive interesting insights unlike Chari et al. (2019) 
who undertake different composite measures of corporate governance for all firms at a time, and, 
don’t find any significant impact of individual corporate governance mechanisms on firm’s such 
risk-return associations. Secondly, here risk and return measures are calculated after adjusting for 
firm’s own historical aspiration and its social aspiration in terms to industry peers. This implies 
that both firm’s own heterogeneity (market power, firm-size, etc. discrepancies) and industry 
heterogeneity have been accounted for unlike Chari et al.’s (2019) direct measure of risk and return 
computed from ROA. Finally, Chari et al.’s (2019) paper is based on USA firms (i.e. developed 
market context) whereas this study uses Indian firms i.e. in an emerging market context with 
distinctive variability in regard to investors protection rights and risk-orientation in national 
culture. Accordingly, this study can argue that its results will portray different theoretical 
underpinnings for the concerned risk-return association and corporate governance literature.       
One of the most significant results the study reports is that small board size and lower women 
directors’ presence is causing the ‘paradoxical’ risk-return association for low performing firms 
and they also develop a conventional positive one for high performing ones. On the contrary, large 
board size and higher women directors’ presence could create a negative risk-return association 
for high performing firms. These results imply agency problems (Jensen 1993; Chari et al. 2019) 
and problemistic search behaviours (Gupta 2017; DasGupta and Pathak 2018) for low performing 
firms. On the contrary, for high performing firms, the study’s observation is that higher women 
dominance in boards (Adams and Funk 2012) and large board size (contradicting empirical 
literature [see e.g. Sah and Stiglitz 1986; 1991; Cheng 2008; etc.]) are actually creating a risk-
seeking behavior and thereby causing value-destruction (Andersen et al. 2007; and Chari et al. 
2019) for these firms. Lack of quality management (Wiemann and Mellewigt 1998) is also evident 
in these firms.    
 
Another interesting finding of this study is that executive directors’ remuneration is driving a 
paradoxical risk-return association for both low and high performing firms. This implies that 
managerial compensation driven firm performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976) is evident in all 
Indian firms (in line with Akbar et al. 2017). However, irrespective of low (mixed under 
multivariate) or high performing firms, managers are risk-averse which depicts cronyism (Brick 
et al. 2006).  
 
The study also reports that a busy board, higher board tenure and board meetings is only 
influencing a ‘paradoxical’ risk-return association for high performing firms. The study reiterates 
Sarkar’s (2009) findings for Indian firms as it presents negative impact of board busyness on firm-
performance. On the contrary, in line with Fich and Shivdasani, (2006); Falato et al. (2014); etc., 
the study finds that busy directors are associated with higher risk-taking in high performing firms 
which might be due to less effective monitoring or implies value-reducing risk-taking (Andersen 
et al. 2007; and Chari et al. 2019). The study results contradict with the ‘reputation hypothesis’ 
(Chen 2015) that higher board tenure mitigates the career concerns for board members with 
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enhanced reputation which in turn could generate higher returns at lower level of firm-risk. It rather 
finds that higher board tenure is impacting firm performance negatively whereas it has a positive 
influence on firm-risk. This also might depict a value-reducing risk-taking by these firm-managers 
(Andersen et al. 2007; and Chari et al. 2019) or complacency due to no career concerns. The study 
results support Jensen (1993) that in case of high performing firms which might not performing 
well higher board meetings is actually for problemistic firm risk-taking and not resulting in 
superior firm performance (see Lipton and Lorsch 1992; and Ntim and Oser 2011).      
 
In this study, one of the most critical conceptualizations required is to identify a ‘troubled’ firm or 
a firm with ‘quality management’. Accordingly, this study uses prospect theory’s (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) or different risk-preferences (Andersen et al., 2007) arguments to divide all firms 
based on cross-sectional median value of returns i.e. the reference point (in line with strategic 
reference point theory of Feigenbaum et al. 1996), firms above which (i.e. above-median or high 
performing firms) would be risk-averse, and on the contrary, below-median firms (i.e. low 
performing firms) would be risk-seeking. In line with behavioural theory (Cyert and March 1963), 
this study computes both firm’s own historical performance and its social performance (Massini 
et al. 2005) based performance-aspiration gap for short-term (1 year) and long-term (5 years). This 
study’s social performance-aspiration gap measure would also capture the weak decision-making 
abilities of managers who would pursue higher risk strategies with lower returns (see Anderson et 
al. 2007). Presumably, this study expects a negative risk-return association for low performing 
firms and a positive one for high performing firms. However, for high performing firms with 
‘quality management’ and amidst distinctive influential corporate governance mechanisms, low 
risk – high return situations could also entail a Bowman’s ‘paradox’.   
 
The study reports that low performing firms as defined from reference point (Fiegenbaum et al. 
1996) and behavioural theory (Cyert and March 1963) viewpoints depict a ‘paradoxical’ (i.e. 
negative) risk-return association. On the contrary, high performing firms overall show a 
conventional positive risk-return association. However, when the study does quintile study among 
high performing firms, it finds a negative association among the below-median ones. This has 
validated the study’s corporate governance influence under individual mechanisms as it reports 
mixed impact in regard to risk-return association for both low and high performing firms.     
 
So, in summary, the study can conclude that most of the corporate governance mechanisms are 
strongly influencing the ‘paradoxical’ risk-return association across firms. More specifically, each 
of the studied corporate governance mechanisms individual influence in attenuating both 
paradoxical and conventional risk-return associations for firms in Indian context has never 
reported before. The study results also holds true across market cycles; strategic reference points; 
return measures; regulatory shifts; and also, after controlling for firm- and industry-level 
heterogeneities.  
 
The study findings would be of immense help to firm-managers to understand the strengths or 
otherwise of their corporate governance practices, to the investors to undertake their portfolio 
decisions in regard to established risk-return associations under different corporate governance 
settings, and above all to the regulators and policy-makers to develop a more balanced corporate 
governance framework for firms. Its results can also be generalised especially in emerging market 
contexts with similar corporate governance regimes. However, one of the limitations of this study 
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is that in many corporate governance literature ownership patterns is used in evaluating firm 
performance and risk, which is ignored here in examining corporate governance role in risk-return 
paradox. This is because most of the sample firms are family-controlled with block holdings. 
Future researchers could also examine the impact of individual corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm’s ‘paradoxical’ or conventional risk-return association from a cross-country and/or 
development country perspective. The influence of legal system, national culture, economic 
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